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College Residency Requirements
Thomas G. Longo* and George M. Schroeck**
M ANY STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES differentially classify students
as "residents" or "nonresidents." 1 Such institutional classifica-
tions have no legal effect regarding the students' legal domicile for other
purposes, yet a classification of "nonresident" generally imposes the cor-
relative of paying a substantially higher rate of tuition.
Students, in many instances, unwittingly bind themselves for the du-
ration of their college life to a nonresident classification merely by filling
out the initial application for admission. The classification of "nonresi-
dent" may automatically be assigned by the university after receiving
the student's application and, in most cases, remains an impregnable
brand dissipated only upon graduation.
University classifications tend to be "computer-permanent" after
initial programmed consummation. Thereafter, only administrative or ju-
dicial proceedings can realign a student's classification. Most universities
have residency review committees, usually comprised of administrators
who are not legally oriented, who apply the rules or guidelines promul-
gated by state residency boards or university trustees. Such regulations
are generally applied unquestioningly and without flexibility by the com-
mittee as the ruling criteria. 2
Typical of such rules or guidelines are the criteria promulgated by
the Ohio Board of Regents Residency Standards. Those regulations pro-
vide in part:
D. State Resident
In determining whether or not an enrolled student is an Ohio resi-
dent for appropriation subsidy purposes, each state-assigned institu-
tion will make a determination of fact in accordance with these
standards:
2. An adult student over 21 years of age is considered to be an
Ohio resident if he has resided in the state for 12 consecutive
months or more immediately preceding enrollment, or if he is
gainfully employed on a full-time basis and is residing in Ohio,
* B.S., Bowling Green State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law; Bailiff-Law Clerk to Hon. Robert B. Krupansky of the
United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio.
* B.S., Edinhoro State College; Third-year student at Cleveland State University
College of Law.
1 The term "resident" has no set definition. Its exact meaning is left to construction,
to be determined from the context and apparent object to be attained from the
legislative enactment. 18 OHIO Jur. 2d Domicil §4 (1956). Whether a probate,
divorce or tax case, the question of residence is a nebulous one, to be answered
only from the specifics of each case. See Reese and Green, That Elusive Word,
"Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953); see State ex rel. Kaplan v. Kuhn, 11 Ohio
Dec. 321, 8 Ohio N.P. 197 (C.P. Hamilton County Ct. 1901); Board of Educ. v. Dille,
109 Ohio App. 344, 165 N.E.2d 807 (1959).
2 See generally Note, Residency, Tuition, and the Twelve-Month Dilemma, 7 HousT.
L. REV. 241 (1969); McClean, The Meaning of Residence, 11 INTr'L. & CoaUv. L. Q. 1153
(1962); Comment, Nonresident Tuition Charged by State Universities in Review,
38 U.M.K.C. 341 (1970); Spencer, The Legal Aspects of the Nonresident Tuition Fee,
6 ORE. L. REV. 332 (1927).
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and is pursuing a part-time program of instruction, and if there
is reason to believe that he did not enter Ohio primarily in order
to enroll in an Ohio institution of higher education.
4. A student who enters the State of Ohio from another state for
the primary purpose of enrolling in an Ohio institution of higher
education shall be considered to be a nonresident student, and
shall continue to be considered a nonresident student during the
period of continuous full-time enrollment in an Ohio institution
of higher education.
5. A student classified as a nonresident student may be reclassified
as a resident of Ohio if:
a) The parents of a student under 21 years of age take up resi-
dence in Ohio and one of the parents is gainfully employed
on a full-time basis in Ohio.
b) The student over 21 years of age presents clear and con-
vincing evidence to an administrative officer or administra-
tive panel of the institution and there is finding of exceptional
circumstances justifying a change in classification because of
having established a separate residence in Ohio for 12 months
or more preceding the request for reclassification and because
of having made definite commitments to enter into gainful em-
ployment in Ohio upon completion of a degree program.3
The right to enact such rules is beyond question, since public uni-
versities and colleges are subject to the control of the legislature and,
as such, are invested with the duty of promoting the public welfare.
4
Such delegated power to college and university authorities implies the
implementation of all necessary and proper rules and regulations for the
orderly management of educational institutions. A priori, the rules ex-
ercised under the power so delegated by statute is of the same force
as would be an enactment of the legislature, and the official interpreta-
tion by the university officials would be a part thereof. Whether the
rules or regulations are wise or expedient or their aims worthy is a
matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities, and with the exer-
cise of such discretion of the authorities the courts will not interfere, in
the absence of a clear showing that the authority vested in them.5
Ohio, for example, empowers its higher educational institutions with
the necessary authority to exact nonresident tuition fees: "The board
of trustees of a state university. . . may charge reasonable tuition for at-
tendance of pupils who are nonresidents of Ohio." 6
Frequently a student may find himself legally domiciled in his uni-
versity state under the color of both state and federal law, but still held
by the university to a nonresident status and thereby required to pay a
higher tuition than his fellow students.
Modern transportation and communications provide easy means for
one to live away from his familial home at an age of 18 or 19. Statistics
3 Ohio Bd. of Regents Residency Standards, § D, H 2, 4, 5a, 5b (Approved Jan. 16,
1970).
4 State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202 (1929).
5 Spencer, supra note 2.
6 Omo Rv. CoDE § 3345.01 (SuP. 1970).
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frequently depict this tendency as rising rather than subsiding.7 The law
has also adjusted itself to this situation, leaving only the university resi-
dency review committee behind to fend for itself.
. Acquiring a domicile of one's own choice essentially requires 1)
physical or bodily presence in the new locality; 2) an intent to abandon
the old domicile; and 3) a concurrent intent to adopt another domicile in
the new location.8 Despite the fact a student may change his domicile
to that of his college or university state, and that courts will recognize
the change as legal, this very often will not affect the student's university
classification as nonresident.
The explanation for this paradox lies with university durational resi-
dency requirements, i.e., a student is considered to be a state resident
".. . if he has resided in the state for 12 consecutive months or more im-
mediately preceding enrollment. . ."... 9
Such rules discriminatorily create classifications among citizen stu-
dents of the same state. Though discriminatory, they are far less ob-
jectionable than the rule which generally accompanies residency require-
ments, which holds that any student who enters the state "for the pri-
mary purpose of enrolling in an Ohio [state] institution of higher educa-
tion shall be considered a nonresident student during the period of con-
tinuous full-time enrollment . ,, 10
The cases where students have turned to the courts for redress are
few. However, a review of those cases, the theories sued on, and the re-
sults attained, seems appropriate at this point.
One of Ohio's earliest residency cases, still in effect today, held it
necessary for each court to weigh all of the facts of each particular case
before rendering any decision. These facts, along with the attendant in-
tention of each student, must control. Neither the state nor federal con-
stitutions impose barriers on the travel and domiciles of its citizens. If
a court is shown that an individual, at least if he is an adult, traveled
to another state for self betterment in occupational or educational areas,
the courts must recognize such intent, along with external manifesta-
tions of such intent, as binding on the court in forming a decision. That
an individual student has familial ties or property interests in another
state is merely one fact to be considered; by no means should it hold
predominance.'1
The courts have also taken a stand as to the determination of
whether aliens qualify as residents for purposes of university classifica-
tion. In Halaby v. Board of Directors, the court held that an alien resi-
dent was entitled to the same privileges as other residents of the city, in
that he and his parents were bona fide residents and taxpayers of the
city, even though they were not U. S. citizens.
12
7 Oboler, Higher Education-Ideas and the State University, 95 ScH. & Soc. 78 (1967).
8 Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
9 Ohio Bd. of Regents Residency Standards, § D, H (2), (Approved Jan. 16, 1970).
10 Id. at 11 (4).
11 State ex rel. Kaplan v. Kuhn, 11 Ohio Dec. 321, 8 Ohio N.P. 197 (C.P. Hamilton
County Ct. 1901).
12 Halaby v. Board of Directors, 162 Ohio St. 290, 123 NE.2d 3 (1964).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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In Newman v. Graham, the State Board of Education, acting as trus-
tees for Idaho State College, had promulgated a regulation which read
in part, "... any person who is properly classified as a nonresident stu-
dent retains that status throughout continuous regular term attendance
at any institution of higher learning in Idaho." 13 At first glance this
rule would seem to effectively preclude consideration of reclassification
even if intent to establish domicile could be legally proven.
The Supreme Court of Idaho, after recognizing the Board of Educa-
tion's delegated authority from the legislature to make such rules stated:
Under the interpretation placed upon the foregoing quoted regula-
tion by the Board it would necessarily follow that a student who is
a nonresident of the State at the time of initial enrollment at the
College would, if he attends each regular term, retain such status
throughout his entire college career irrespective of the fact that he
may have become a bona fide resident and domiciled more than six
months in the State during the intervening time. Under such an in-
terpretation it does not afford any opportunity to show a change of
residence or domiciliary status and does in effect deny equality of
opportunity to persons of the same class who are similarly situated
and for that reason it is an unreasonable regulation.14
The Board's authority to inquire as to residency requirements was
unquestioned. Yet the regulation's denial of the applicant's opportunity
to be heard in the consideration of the matter was most objectionable.
For this reason the regulation was held to be arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.
In a similar case, the plaintiff student commenced action against the
university on the grounds of unjust enrichment, challenging the constitu-
tionality of a statute which held that a student who had registered could
not qualify for a change in his classification for tuition purposes unless
he had completed 12 continuous months of residence while not attend-
ing an institution of higher learning in the state, or while serving in the
armed forces.15
The petitioner argued that the statute was unconstitutional in that it
violated the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. But the Su-
preme Court of Colorado did not agree, and instead ruled upon language
in Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong,16 to the effect that ". . . to constitute
class legislation within the constitutional prohibition, the classification
must be unreasonable. The question of classification is primarily for the
Legislature." 17
In Clark v. Radeker,'8 a U. S. district court confronted a similar case
and held the one year residency requirement constitutional, applying the
classical equal protection test of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.19
13 Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 92, 349 P.2d 716, 717 (1960).
14 Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719.
15 Landwehr v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
16 91 Colo. 334, 336, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932).
17 156 Colo. 1, 4, 396 P.2d 451, 453 (1964).
18 Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa, 1966).
19 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); See Note, Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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The court, speaking of the regulation in general, said, ". . . any determi-
nation in conformity with them which is not unreasonable or arbitrary
must be upheld by the courts. As previously discussed, a student from
another state attending SUI is presumed to be a nonresident. The pre-
sumption is by no means conclusive. If a proper showing is made, a stu-
dent originally from out of state should be reclassified as a resident." 20
The burden was placed upon the student to present a substantial basis,
from facts, for the committee to review in such a reclassification pro-
cedure.
The classical test for determining the constitutionality of statutory
classifications as found in the above cases was promulgated by the
U. S. Supreme Court in the Lindsley case.2 1 The four rather broad
rules stated therein have been referred to and quoted innumerously by
the courts in similar cases. They are as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of dis-
cretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some in-
equality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sus-
tain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary.2 2
A vast area of administrative law which affects thousands of in-
dividuals yearly is the welfare residency law. The same basic require-
ments for welfare applicants are applied to students. At least this was
so until April 1969, when the U. S. Supreme Court affirmed three federal
district court decisions 23 holding that, absent a compelling state interest,
statutory provisions requiring a one year residency for state welfare as-
sistance were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment by imposing a classification on welfare applicants which im-
pinged upon their constitutional right to travel freely from state to
state.2
4
The Court, speaking of the bureaucratic arguments advanced to
justify the residency requirements stated:
20 Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 125 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
21 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
22 Id. at 78, 79.
23 Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'c sub nom. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
aff'd sub nor. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270
F. Supp. 333 (D. Conn. 1967), afl'd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
24 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); See also Note, Residency Requirements,
21 WEST. RES. L. REV. 571 (1970); Note, Residence Waiting Period, 6 TULSA L. J. 268(1970).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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...even under traditional equal protection tests a classification of
welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the
State for one year would seem irrational and unconstitutional
[footnote omitted]. But, of course, the traditional criteria do not
apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must
be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a com-
pelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting period re-
quirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.
25
Yet, prior to the Court's conclusion, it is pointed out that no im-
plication should be drawn hereafter that the case overturned the va-
lidity of waiting periods or residence requirements determining the
eligibility to vote, for tuition-free education, to obtain a driver's license,
to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, et cetera. Such requirements,
the Court held, may promote a compelling state interest on the exer-
cise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
20
Mr. Chief Justice Warren seemed to feel that the keystone to
toppling other state statutory residency requirements had been dan-
gerously dislodged when he observed in his dissent, joined by Justice
Black:
Nor can I understand the Court's implication ... that other state
residence requirements such as those employed in the determining
eligibility to vote do not present constitutional questions. . . If a
State would violate equal protection by denying welfare benefits
to those who have recently moved interstate, then it would appear
to follow that equal protection would also be denied by depriving
those who have recently moved interstate of the fundamental right
to vote.
The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking
beneath are the multitude of situations in which States have im-
posed residence requirements including eligibility to vote, to engage
in certain professions or occupations or to attend a state-supported
university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid acknowledging
the ramifications of its decision, its implications cannot be ignored.27
What the court did in Shapiro was to extend the use of the "com-
pelling governmental interest" test by applying it to state welfare du-
rational residency requirements and finding they served no "com-
pelling state interest." 28
After Shapiro, a student at the University of California, who had
been classified as a nonresident for several years, petitioned the court for
25 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638. Those administrative and related govern-
mental objectives supposedly served by the residency requirements were: that it
(1) facilitated planning of the welfare budget, (2) provided an objective test of
residency, (3) minimized the opportunity for recipients to fraudulently receive pay-
ments from more than one jurisidiction, (4) encouraged early entry of new residents
into the labor force. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961);
Flemming v. Mestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
26 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638.
27 Id. at 654, 655.
28 For other applications of the compelling state interest test, see Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463(1958).
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a writ of mandate demanding her reclassification from nonresident to that
of resident. 29 The Superior Court entered judgment for the Board of
Regents and the student appealed.
On appeal the petitioner alleged that she qualified as a resident
student because in the fall of 1967, she was charged a nonresident fee,
due to a requirement that a person must have been a bona fide resident
of the state for more than one year immediately preceding the opening
day of the semester. She alleged that the regulation was an unconstitu-
tional interference with her fundamental right of interstate travel, and
that no compelling government interest justified it. She argued that all
of these questions have been conclusively determined in her favor by
Shapiro.
In its decision, the California Court of Appeals interpreted Shapiro
to mean that no intent could be drawn from that case which would
supply the same standard of residency requirements to those in ques-
tion. The compelling state interest test was not applied by the court and
the durational residency requirement was upheld under the traditional
test, the court holding the nonresident classification was rationally re-
lated to legitimate state objectives.
In Kirk, the court demonstrated an attitude of not wishing to ex-
tend the trend of Shapiro into other less vital areas of state classifica-
tion. The court did not equate college residency requirements to the
immediate and pressing need for preservation of life and health of per-
sons unable to live without public assistance. Thus, the residency re-
quirements passed on by the court in Shapiro could cause great suffering
and even loss of life. The durational residence requirement for at-
tendance at publicly financed institutions of higher learning did not in-
volve such risks. Yet the logical conclusion seems to have been over-
looked. That is, if a residency requirement proved unconstitutional to
one group because of the right to travel to seek employment, it should
follow that student residency should be subject to the same juristic
conclusion.
More recently, in Harper v. Arizona Board of Regents, an Arizona
trial court found that Arizona's one year durational residency rule
adopted by the Board was unconstitutional. 30 The court's decision relied
on Shapiro v. Thompson and expressly rejected the reasoning in Kirk
v. Board of Regents in finding that the Board's adoption of the one year
residency rule was an infringement on interstate movement, an unreason-
able and invidious discrimination violating the fourteeth amendment of
the U. S. Constitution, and a denial of due process violating the four-
teenth amendment.
The court stated that the status of "resident" could not be denied,
there being no reasonable or "magical" relation to the "one yearism" so
29 Kirk v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr.
260, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554, cert. denied (1970). See also, Case Comments,
The Equal Protection Clause and Durational Residency Requirements for Tuition
Purposes at State Universities, J. PuB. LAw 139 (1969).
30 Harper v. Arizona Board of Regents (Ariz. Super. Ct. Pina County, May 9, 1970).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
COLLEGE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 499
frequently applied by administrative or legislative bodies arbitrarily
designating such a time period as being a requirement to fulfill before
full rights of residents be accorded.31
In another recent case, Thompson v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Nebraska, a Nebraska lower court found a Nebraska law
setting state residence standards for the purpose of nonresident tuition
partially unconstitutional. 32
The first portion of the Nebraska law requiring actual residence
in the state for a period of four months with the intention of permanent
residence before a person is eligible for exemption from nonresident
tuition was found to be constitutional.
A second portion of the section provided that no person could be
deemed to have established residency in the state during the time of
attendance at a state institution, no matter how genuine and long-con-
tinued the actual residence in the state may be. The court found this
section unconstitutional on five grounds: 1) denial of equal protection
of the law; 2) deprivation of property without due process; 3) dis-
crimination between citizens with respect to acquisition, ownership,
possession and enjoyment of property; 4) establishment of a conclusive
presumption contrary to and in disregard of the facts; and 5) absence
of a rational basis and legitimate purpose or function.33
The constitutional issues involving college residency requirements
may ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Starns
v. Malkerson.34 In Starns the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion in a case in which a three-judge federal court held constitutional
a regulation requiring a one year domicile within the state of Minnesota
before being able to acquire resident classification for tuition purposes
at state-supported universities.3 -
The petitioners in Starns married their husbands in Chicago and
in June 1969, obtained employment in and moved to Minnesota. They
enrolled as full-time students at the University of Minnesota for the
1969-1970 school year and were classified nonresidents by the Uni-
versity Board of Review on Student Status effective until the 1970 sum-
s1 Id.
32 Thompson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. (Neb. Dist. Ct. Lancaster
County, Nov. 25, 1970), reported in 3 CoL. L. But. 49 (Feb. 1970).
33 Id.
34 Starns v. Malkerson, ___ F. Supp. ___ (D. Minn. 1970), 39 U.S.L.W. 3406 (1971),
prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3423 (1971).
35 Id. The regulation in question was made pursuant to the Board of Regents'
tuition regulations, as found on the University of Minnesota's "Application for Res-
ident Classification." It provides:
No student is eligible for resident classification in the University, in any college
thereof, unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a
year immediately prior thereto. This requirement does not prejudice the right
of a student admitted on a nonresident basis to be placed thereafter on a res-
ident basis provided he has acquired a bona fide domicile of a year's duration
within the state. Attendance at the University neither constitutes nor necessarily
precludes the acquisition of such a domicile. For University purposes, a student
does not acquire a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a
year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this in-
volves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his completion of
school.
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mer session, at which time they would attain a resident classification. The
1970 summer session coincided with the first anniversary of their con-
tinued presence in Minnesota.
The petitioners claimed that their physical presence in Minnesota,
and their intention to make Minnesota their permanent home, estab-
lished them as bona fide domiciliaries of the state. They also claimed
that the one-year durational residency requirement was unreasonable
and violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it discriminates among persons whose situations are other-
wise identical solely on the basis of the exercise of a constitutionally
protected liberty-freedom of interstate movement.
In deciding the case, the district court primarily concerned itself
with the issue as to whether or not the state could create an irrebuttable
presumption that a person who has not resided continuously within the
state for one year prior to registration is a nonresident for tuition pur-
poses.
The court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Shapiro v. Thompson
which was argued in support of the contention that the regulation de-
terred persons from moving into the state. The court stated that there
were no facts to prove that the specific objective of the regulation was
exclusion or deterrence of nonresident students, and that there was no
showing that the durational residence requirement involved immediate
and pressing needs for life and health similar to Shapiro.
The petitioners also contended that the regulation was arbitrary and
unreasonable because it established an irrebuttable presumption that a
person is a nonresident for tuition purposes if he has not lived in the
state for one year preceding registration. The court also rejected this
argument stating that "This presumption can be overcome if the student
provides sufficient evidence to show bona fide domiciliary within the
State, one element which is proof that he has resided within the State
for a period of one year." 36
As to the final question of whether or not the nonresident classifi-
cation was reasonably related to a legitimate objective of the state, the
court accepted the reasoning of the holdings in Clark v. Redeker"7 and
Kirk v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado."8 The reasoning
in Clark and Kirk held that the state does have a legitimate interest in
attempting to achieve partial cost equalization between those who have
and those who have not recently contributed to the state's economy
through employment, tax payments and expenditures.
Conclusion
The practice of many state colleges and universities in classifying
bona fide residents of the state as nonresidents simply because they
have not resided in the state for a year prior to entering the university,
or because they entered the state primarily for educational purposes
36 Starns v. Malkerson, ____ F. Supp. -___ (D. Minn. 1970).
37 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
38 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260.
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and therefore must retain a nonresident status, even though they have
chosen the university state as their domicile, violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
If a state would provide resident classification for all students
actually domiciled in the state, without regard to the length of time
spent within the state, there would be neither financial hardship imposed
upon the state, nor would the administrative requirement of hearing
student requests for reclassification be overburdensome.
Whether or not the necessity for higher education has become in-
creasingly important or fundamental so as to be considered by the Su-
preme Court in Starns remains to be seen. In any event, it is submitted
that in time the majority spirit of Shapiro will meet favorable pre-
vailing judicial winds which will carry "equal protection" out to the
provincial colonies of state higher education.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/8
